Circuit Watcher

06-11351 U.S. v. Burgest
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit Judge, and STORY,¹ District Judge.
DUBINA, Circuit Judge: Appellant Earl Burgest (“Burgest”) appeals his convictions on two counts of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Burgest contends that the district court erred by admitting into evidence his post-arrest statement given to federal authorities after he waived his Miranda² rights but while he had retained counsel for a pending state drug charge. Burgest’s challenge presents an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether the dual sovereignty doctrine³ applies to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Based on the following discussion, we join the majority of circuits and hold that the dual sovereignty doctrine applies in the Sixth Amendment context. Because the drug offenses violated the laws of separate sovereigns, the state and federal offenses are not the same for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Thus, Burgest’s right to counsel had not attached to his uncharged federal offenses at the time he made his incriminating statements. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting Burgest’s post-arrest statement into evidence, and we affirm his convictions. … U.S. v. Burgest

1. Honorable Richard W. Story, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. [↩]
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). [↩]
3. The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government. When a defendant in a single act violates the ‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct ‘offences.’” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88, 106 S. Ct. 433, 437 (1985) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382, 43 S. Ct. 141, 142 (1922)). [↩]